

SHRI BASU DEB ACHARIA (Bankura) : Hon. Chairman, Sir, I do not want to oppose this Bill But at the same time I want to assert that our experience with the implementation of the present Industrial Disputes Act and its various agencies like Regional Labour Commissioner, Tribunals, Labour Court has not been very favourable either. Time and again the demand has been raised in the House as well as by the Trade Unions that the present Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 should be replaced. A number of sections in the existing Act are no relevant. These sections in the existing Act are not relevant. These sections should be so amended as to make them relevant in the present context in the interest of the workers. We also wanted that a comprehensive Bill should be brought forward. The draft which was put up in this respect did not come up to our expectations, therefore we and other Trade Unions did not support the draft. When Govt wanted to convert Public Sector Undertakings like Air India, Indian Airlines, Industrial Finance Corporation and ONGC etc. into public sector limited Companies, we strongly opposed such a move on the part of the Govt.

[English]

It should remain a Public Sector.

[Translation]

But inspite of our strong opposition the bill was passed because Govt. had the majority. The condition prevailing today is the result of our liberalisation policy...(Interruptions) We have never supported the policy of liberalisation no matter we sat in the opposition or on the treasury benches...(Interruptions)

SHRI SRIBALLAV PANIGRAHI (Deogarh) : You have gained the maximum benefit in West Bengal.

SHRI BASU DEB ACHARIA : We did not gained any benefit.

The Common Minimum Programme of the United Front mentions that the interests of the workers will be protected. We want that a separate Bill for recognition of union through secret ballot should be brought forward in the House. Earlier when there was National Front Govt. a bill for the workers's participation in the management was drafted. The definition of the workmen in the draft of the Bill contained many flaws and contradiction. While the Bill was under consideration the Govt. fell and the Bill could not be passed. Now we can introduce some improvements in the Bill. The dispute arises when a Union which has been recognised loses its majority gradually and the other union which has gained majority remains unrecognised. The management continues to deal with the minority union. There had been a strike in the textile industry which continued for about a month. The recognised union in that industry is INTUC but it has no majority. The strike call was given by the other union but the management did not negotiate with that Union. The strike continued for about a year and it has created history of a sort in the trade Union movement. We want that a separate Bill be brought forward by the Govt. at the earliest. Disputes

would always arise between the workers and the management. Therefore there is an imprative need of a conciliation machinery. We have a sad experience that in most cases the conciliation machinery proves a failure, and a failure report is submitted to the Government. It often taken months to refer such cases to the Tribunal. Tribunal takes ten to fifteen years to decide a case. We must see to it that the time taken in the process is minimised.

[English]

How can we reduce the delay in the settlement of the cases. The cases of Central Govt. employees are now referred to the Central Administrative Tribunal.

MR. CHAIRMAN : Would you continue tomorrow.

SHRI BASU DEB ACHARIA : I will continue tomorrow.

16.00 hrs.

DISCUSSION UNDER RULE 193

Chinese Nuclear Test and CTBT

[English]

MR. CHAIRMAN : The House shall now take up discussion under rule 193 regarding Chinese nuclear test and CTBT. the hon. Minister of External Affairs is to make a statement on this subject.

16.01 hrs.

(Mr. Speaker in the Chair)

THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI I.K. GUJRAL) : Mr. Speaker, Sir, I had addressed this House on the Issue of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the 15th July,1996 setting out Government's Policy on this issue. The discussion that followed reflected the national consensus underlying the Government's policy. I am speaking today because of new developments of which hon. Members are aware: the 46th test conducted by China on the 29th July, 1996.

Several countries have issued statements expressing their varied points of view. Some of the leading ones while regretting or even condemning the Chinese 45th nuclear test have, at the same time, noted that after this test, China may join the other nuclear weapon States in observing a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. On our part, we are dismayed by the nuclear tests carried out by nuclear weapon States, particularly as the CTBT negotiations are in progress. We have always believed that these tests take the world further way from the goal of universal nuclear disarmament. As this House knows, since 1945, the five nuclear weapon States have carried out 2047 tests. The USA and Russia have conducted 210 tests while China and UK have conducted 45 tests each. These tests have contributed to the nuclear arms race and shown that partial steps do not lead to nuclear disarmament.

India has taken a consistent and principled position on nuclear disarmament. This is why, since 1954 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for a ban on nuclear weapon tests we have urged that the CTBT must be seen as a first steps on the road to nuclear disarmament. The approach taken by India in the CTBT negotiations, therefore, calls for a genuinely comprehensive CTBT with a view to ending future development of nuclear weapons and placing the CTBT in the framework of a step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. On-going testing programmes whether at test sites or in laboratories, are clear indications that the nuclear weapon States are not willing to give up their reliance on their nuclear arsenals and consider the CTBT merely as a non-proliferation measure.

Such testing programmes inevitably give rise to questions relating to India's national security, while we have adopted a policy of restraint after demonstrating our capability, we remain fully conscious of the evolving security situation. We are committed to taking all steps necessary to enable us to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of India.

As hon. Members are aware, I was in Jakarta last week to attend the meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the post-Ministerial Conference. There, I also had a number of bilateral meetings with Foreign Ministers from other countries present. Some of them, notably, the US secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Iwano of Japan, Foreign Minister Downer of Australia and the Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy discussed with me the CTBT negotiations at Geneva. I elucidated in clear terms the Indian point of view. I also highlighted the consistency in our policy as well as the strength of conviction arising out of the national consensus. During multilateral meetings, this subject also came up. Many of our concerns were shared by other participants. These concerns were most clearly voiced by the Chairman, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Alatas who appreciated India's principled stand about the goal of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world as well as the need to ensure that the CTBT brings an end to vertical proliferation.

The CTBT negotiations have resumed in Geneva in the Conference on Disarmament day before yesterday, that is on the 29th July, 1996.

Our stand in the negotiations is appreciated by many countries. Several non-aligned countries are in favour of strengthening the provisions relating to "scope" as also the references to nuclear disarmament in the draft Treaty text. They show understanding of our position, and, in particular, they acknowledge that the present formulation on Entry into Force is without precedent in treaty negotiating practice. Yet, these countries find it difficult to accept our proposals to modify the draft treaty text because of the rigid position adopted by a small number of countries. In our statements and in bilateral discussions, we have made it clear that

India cannot sign the Treaty in its present form. We have also made it equally clear that India cannot permit any language in the draft treaty text which will impose an obligation on India, directly or indirectly. If there are attempts to push forward such a text, we will have to oppose such efforts. We continue to remain engaged in the negotiations in Geneva in order that our national interests are fully safeguarded.

SHRI SAT MAHAJAN (Kangra) : Sir, I have a point of clarification here. The photographs of Shri Gujral and of the Chinese Foreign Minister have appeared. They have been in deep consultation. He has not mentioned about that...*(interruptions)* I would like to know what has happened.

MR. SPEAKER : No, Shri Mahajan, this is not the way.

(Interruptions)

LT. GENERAL SHRI PRAKASH MANI TRIPATHI (Deoria) : Mr. Speaker, Sir, the hon. Minister of External Affairs had first given a *suo motu* statement on 15th of July about the CTBT. And that was the time when we had asked for a discussion on the subject. The Conference on Disarmament had just ended on 28th of June. It was going to resume on 29th of July. In between, there was of Conference of ASEAN countries which the hon. Minister of External Affairs was attending and in which this subject was also to be discussed. All that is past now. For some reasons, we could not discuss this earlier. Now the Conference has started on 29th July. There are many things that have been stated by the Minister of External Affairs. But there are many things that have not been said by him and also many things that need clarification.

Firstly, the Indian Plan on the Nuclear Disarmament was put through in the United Nations General Assembly on 9th of June, 1988 in which the Action Plan Stated, among other things that, firstly, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in stages by the year 2010 at the latest. It is now 1996. This was said in 1988.

Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be a part of this process. Thirdly, "to demonstrate good faith and to build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal." we do not see any of these anywhere on the nuclear agenda. Instead we have first the NPT and now CTBT. There is no mention of disarmament the way we wanted it.

The United States Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the National Security Council have quite clearly stated that "we need nuclear weapons for the next 50 years and beyond". Just before the commencement of the Conference of disarmament, France carried out tests in quick succession, China carried out tests in quick succession and we know that recently also China has carried out a test in total disregard to what is going on or the direction in which the CTBT is supposed to take us all. So, there is no evidence to suggest that there is any commitment on

disarmament on the part of nuclear weapon countries and you have also come to this conclusion that indeed there is none.

We carried out a test in 1974. In 1968, China had carried out its first test. We should not only look at the total of 45 tests that they have carried out but we should look at the span in which they have been deliberately carrying out tests and they have been carrying out tests in violation and in confrontation with all the norms that the international community has laid down. This is the point that has to be borne in mind. Our neighbour, China is totally uncontrollable in this matter and therefore, not only has our environment nuclearised but it has been nuclearised in the hands of a country that takes no notice of international conventions, international directions or whatever talks are going on. They are active participants of these talks and they have carried out the tests just three days back.

What have we done in these 22 years? We have carried out debates. What were the debates about? What is on our capability? We have already demonstrated those capability. Was it on our financial resources, our viability or the desirability of carrying out these tests? A lot of morality is thrown into this and we are unable to look at this problem in the cold light of reasoning. We think that we are occupying the moral high ground. Is having a bomb immoral? When your neighbours have it, when your neighbours who are uncontrollable have it, is it immoral? Using it as a deterrence immoral? Yes, its 'first use' is immoral, using as a form of coercion is immoral but this is precisely what the nuclear countries are doing at the moment. CTBT is the form of nuclear coercion that they are doing in the conference, giving it good names, a respectable place to talk about but basically, it is a nuclear coercion.

Sir, the only immoral thing is to abdicate our responsibility and the ability to deal with nuclear coercion. The only immoral thing is not to look at our supreme national security interest.

We have lost a lot of ground since 1974. This country of ours ranks among the top five nations in technology attainment and with all that, we are being pushed into wilderness of nuclear have-nots. And we have got to this status because of our escapist and ambiguous nuclear policy. This escapist policy, drift and dithering have encouraged the West to apply pressure on us in one form or the other, whether it is NPT or CTBT.

Later on they may give it another name and call it as Missile Control Technology Treaty. But this pressure is mainly because they find us as escapists and dithering.

Sir, the Statement of the Minister of External Affairs reminded me of an iceberg. It definitely showed something but hid a lot. There is another reason why it reminded me of an iceberg. An iceberg has no locomotion of its own. It has no direction of its own. It is totally subject to the currents and cross-currents of the sea and when it reaches warm water it dissolves. It loses its shape. This is exactly what it has reminded us.

In this Conference, which has just ended, we may say that a number of countries were with us. Just now the hon. Minister of External Affairs said that our stand was appreciated by a number of countries but no country worth the name has backed us. We have no friends in this. Nobody is prepared to vote with us. Nobody is prepared to walk two steps with us. The main reason is that some of them do not themselves want the CTBT. The others want us to sign on the dotted line.

Our great friend Russia had said, they would not let us get ways from this. Pakistan says, "We are in it if India is in it". And, the British Ambassador says, "India is a recalcitrant country wriggling off the hook". Virtually every State is away from us in this. This is a serious thing. We say that we occupy a moral high ground but nobody is with us on this treaty, either they want us to sign or they will be using us to get off the hook themselves by blaming India for destabilising this treaty, of taking it off the rail. This is an amazing situation. Appreciation is not good enough in the world of real politics. Where are the people who are with us on this issue?

Basically, the Nuclear Powers want to perpetuate a family of haves and a family of have nots. Basically the CTBT is an effort in nuclear apartheid. Are we going to accept that? The treaty is all very well in its own place but what about our national security? What about the nuclearisation of our environment? In that, we must look at the capability of a country not its stated intentions. Today, one of our Northern neighbours may say that we are very friendly. They had said it before also and we came to know otherwise. Therefore, we have to go by the capability and the stark truth is that our North has been nuclearised. Our West is fast getting nuclearised and, therefore, we should look at it from the point of view whether we can withstand nuclear coercion, and whether we can give a befitting reply to this nuclear coercion. Only a few days back, on a query in Rajya Sabha, the hon. Minister of External Affairs said, "It is not necessary to make the bomb now. Tomorrow, I do not know".

Why is it not necessary now? What parameters will lead us to a decision to make the bomb? Which crises are we waiting for? Has not our environment been nuclearised? Is Pakistan not making a galloping progress? Is China not a nuclear power, and a threat? Every time the Bharatiya Janta Party has asked this question, we have been told that it is not the right time. What is the definition of this 'right time'? I specifically want to read here a part of the statement of the hon. Minister of External Affairs of 15th July.

"We continue to maintain our options so that we are able to take all necessary measures to cope with any threat that may be posed to the security of the nation. ...On the basis of recent statements and developments, we have been obliged to conclude that the nuclear weapon States have no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons. This makes it inescapable that our national security

considerations will be the governing factor in our decision-making."

But no bomb!

This is one aspect that knocks the bottom out of our security concern statements. What is our security concern. What other security environments are we looking for? We take a totally mutually contradictory stand now that we want to keep our options, we want to look after our security, but no bomb!

This is a national issue, not a party issue. More so, it is a national security issue. It is a national security issue of a very very long range implication. It is not today or tomorrow that we can decide and get on with it. I feel, and we have been talking for a long time, that we should go in for a bomb. I feel that all these problems, all these negative requirements - to say "No NPT", "I would not sign CTBT" - would go if we had a plan, if we had an option, if we had something which we could say we will also do.

Prof. Cohen, a security specialist on South Asia, has just one sentence to say, "No sovereign country is going to compromise its survival for the sake of a treaty". I think, that is quite sufficient. Our own thinkers have said that for quite some time, but somehow we refuse to gain initiative. We refuse to take initiative and evolve a positive policy that will enable us to have a say in the nuclear matter.

It is reported that our representative in the Conference of Disarmament had said that there was no serious consultation with India. Yet, India is a nuclear threshold State. That is our only power that we have some capability, we have know capability to be able to make a nuclear device, a nuclear weapon, and she says there have been no serious consultations with India. This is her own statement. Can we evolve a policy that would cope with the nuclearisation of our security environment?

Can we evolve a policy that will enable us to cross that *Laxman rekha* from a nuclear-capable State to nuclear weapon State?

There is another important matter about Entry in Force. There are a few specific questions on this. Firstly, do we intend to block this Treaty or do we merely intend to stand aside and let others sign it? If we intend to block it - because if we do not, then this has no meaning - how do we propose to do it? It says:

"India should sign it. In three years' time, if it has not signed it, then there will be another Conference how to accelerate the entry in force."

It really means in a fine language how to put pressure to accelerate our interest? Supposing we do not sign it, and we just stand aside, are we going to allow a smooth passage otherwise? How do we block it from the States' deciding to put India aside, get it ratified by certain countries, send it to U.N. General Assembly, and have it passed by a simple majority? What is our exact policy? We have to have a blue-print, a clear cut blue-print which will see the problem through

in the long range. It is quite clear that the nuclear countries are desperate to get India into sign this Treaty. It is also quite clear that this is important to them. I may compliment the External Affairs Minister that his stand in ASEAN, has been forthright. It has been clear and within the restricted parameters that he has been working. I must compliment him. But these are the questions, on which people, are working to circumvent our moves to put us aside, if required, and thereafter make sure that the Treaty gets ratified and there passed in the U.N. General Assembly. How are we going to block it? We have to think long term on this issue. Just now, this morning, I find a softening of our attitude in today's papers. A number of ploys are being tried out to push that CTBT, despite India's stand and at some place India's softened stand at CTBT. Doubts on key provisions may delay CTBT. West may bypass India to push through CTBT. Is there any softening to our attitude? Is there any resiling from our original position? Is there any point where we are going back?

That is the other point, Sir, that we will like a clarification on.

Basically, we have just had a major statement by the Leader of the Opposition in Bangalore which can form a blue-print or what we are talking about. I will just read out some portions before I conclude :

"India should block the draft from attaining a consensus and prevent it from being forwarded to the U.N. General Assembly when the draft comes up for consideration on July 29th in Geneva..."

"...Today our national security is threatened as never before. China and Pakistan, which have committed aggression against us, possess nuclear weapons. It is absolutely necessary that India possesses nuclear weapons and India should also be a nuclear weapon power. Nuclear Weapon States want India to remain nuclear naked. India cannot agree to such an international regime — what he called Apartheid. Draft Treaty was not linked to nuclear disarmament."

We, the BJP, have been demanding that CTBT should be linked to the elimination of nuclear weapons globally within a specified timeframe."

Finally, Sir, all that I want to say is that we have to develop options. We have lost our no options, deliberately, unilaterally and by ourselves. Nobody cares two brass buttons whether we explode or we test or we do not. The biggest example of that is, that China has a nuclear explosion and then unilaterally says that 'it has declared a moratorium.' Everybody is very happy about the moratorium. Nobody is saying the explosion has taken place, it has been done by a country which is taking part in these negotiations and which is an active nuclear power. Nobody cares about it.

I hope, Sir, you will take notice of our concern and develop an option that we have been talking about all these days.

DR. MALLIKARJUN (Mahbubnagar) : Mr. Speaker, Sir, before us, we have to statements made by the Minister of External affairs, one on 15th July and another just now. To the extent the Statement is concerned, it may be a satisfactory one, but exactly, the linkage between the CTBT and global disarmament is a time-bound framework. this is a new stand.

As back as 1954, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, with his vision, had categorically mentioned that total disarmament is essential for the progress and prosperity of the world as a whole and not merely India. Since then, in spite of pursuance of India in various international fora, hundreds of tests were conducted, particularly by the nuclear weapon States, that is the United States and Russia and of course, if not limited, sizeable tests were conducted by China, the United Kingdom and France.

Now the question arises in the context of the national security as a whole. Our objective of CTBT is to achieve international peace and security through total nuclear disarmament. I do not know whether we will be able to achieve it or not.

I am happy that all the Governments till today have been pursuing the path of disarmament. I remember very well that when I was in a High School, when Panditji, in 1954, had enunciated this total disarmament, we had participated in the debate whether total disarmament is suicidal to the nation or not. At that stage, whatever tests or whatever advancement of exploits in the so-called atom, which was discovered by Dalton, and its emergence of energy from the nucleus of atom were there, today after so many experiments, it is very easy to understand it. It is not a big task. When atom was discovered about two thousand years back, it was lying idle. But today's advancement in science and technology is such that it has created a chaos.

No doubt, cold war has ended. But still, persistence of annihilation of mankind remains. If the civilisation is annihilated, what is the validity of the advancement in science and technology and what is the validity of the production of nuclear weapons? For that reason, in 1974 India had conducted a nuclear underground test for peaceful purposes. Since more than twenty years have passed, we have not conducted any more test. But today, what is essentially required is environment. Now, as you know, the position on the five nuclear weapon State is supreme. Of course, Britain and France do not say much because they are allied with the U.S. Now, actually there are only three nuclear weapon States and they are: Russia, U.S. And China.

Sir, I do not know about the various clauses of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But I can understand that this is not a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We can say it a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty only when there is inclusion of global total disarmament in a time-bounded manner. However, the very interesting fact of reality is this. For example, the main player in the CTBT is U.S. The U.S. can conduct the test.

My second point is that the ban in on the test in laboratories, not only the ban on the test in laboratories

but also on the release of nuclear energy. So, these things are mixed up, camouflaged. But, anyway we have a persistent stated on this Test Ban Treaty or the NPT.

As we know, as far back as 1968, the then Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi had told this august House when the Draft Nuclear Non-Proferation Treaty was under consideration that the nuclear weapons-States would like to have the right to manufacture their nuclear weapons. But others including India should not manufacture a nuclear weapon. How could it be? How can we support the proliferation of nuclear energy? At that time, Shrimati Indira Gandhi had told this august House, while opposing it, that, "We may have to face for difficulties in relation to the assistance and in relation of other help; but we have to make the sacrifice and we have to face the hardship". so, these were the words used by Shrimati Indira Gandhi in this august House in April, 1968.

Sir, now the question arises whether to sign it or not. The Government is very clear about that. Unless and until the promoters of the C.T.B.T. agree for the universal disarmament, there is no question of signing the C.T.B.T. This is the clear stand of the Government of India whether it is the United Front Government or the earlier Congress Government or any other Government including my former Prime Minister, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's 13-day Government.

Then a question is posed that India will be isolated. I would like to ask from this august House as to how India will be isolated. As far as 180 countries are concerned, they have already signed the N.P.T. we have no interest in nuclear arsenals. Out of these 61 countries which are meeting now how many of them except eight are interested. We are treated as threshold to nuclear countries including Pakistan, China and Israel.

Sir, if we take the whole context into consideration, India is in a different geographical position. India has got its own adversaries including its neighbours. Is it not known to the U.S. Administration that Pakistan possesses a nuclear weapon? The then Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan, Shri Aslam Beg had declared that they had a bomb. Is it not known to the U.S. Administration that the former Prime Minister, Shri Nawaz Sarief had declared that there was a nuclear weapon with them? Is it not a fact that the Clinton Administration knew while approving the Hank Brown's amendment that the Pakistan was indulging in sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir? Does it not know? Is it not known to the U.S. Administration that there is an interference in the internal affairs of India by Pakistan? What is that Pakistan is going to lose? Pakistan is like a satellite country to the U.S.A. today.

So, unless India signs it, Pakistan is not going to sign. Now, who is worried about it? The question is that of Isreal. You know, Sir, what the relationship between Isreal and the USA is. Today, the United States and isreal are developing the Tectical High-energy Laser. When the former Prime Minister of Isreal, Mr. Prez visited

the United States, there was an agreement between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Perez to the tune of \$100 million. So, what is that they will lose? If tomorrow anything is needed by Israel, the design can be given to it to produce anything and, if necessary, technology also can be given to it. I do not want to put the Government in an embarrassing situation. Our stand is clear. All political parties, whether it is the BJP or the Communist Parties or any other party, have the same stand on CTBT.

You know, Sir, That there are quite a number of controls. Why did these controls come into existence? Who sponsored these controls? All these controls needle towards India. If you take technology, there is a control by the Zangger Committee and there is also the Vassener Accord on Technology control. If you take the nuclear weapons suppliers' group, there is a committee to control it. If you take biological weapons, there is an Australian group to control them. When it comes to missiles, there is a Missiles Technology Control Regime.

If India produces the *Prithvi* missiles indigenously, US wants and everybody else wants to apply MTCR. If M-11 missiles are supplied by China to Pakistan and if those missiles are deployed, then how are we to see our threat perception? When ring magnets are supplied by China to Pakistan, then nobody object. But the U.S. administration says: "Do not deploy the *Prithvi* missiles". How is it justifiable? Either do not have a total control on Pakistan. Their own agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency does not inspect their nuclear plants. So, it is the regional aspect of security that we are worried about.

In the statement, it is very clear that our options are open. Not only in the statement, we too have been mentioning it. But what does 'the options are open' mean? One test west had conducted in 1974. 'Our options are open' means nuclear option. But if you take the security of the country, then whether nuclear weapons are needed or not, is a question mark. India is a peaceful country. India's contention today is of adding global disarmament in the CTBT because we want international peace and security. When there is international peace and security, automatically there is security and peace in India. This is our approach.

So, now the question of nuclear option comes. It is a question of debate. It is not that merely Mallikarjun telling here in this august House that: "You go for nuclear"; No, it is not like that. India's heritage is such and India's background is such that it is a public debate whether we go for the nuclear option or not. It is a debate between the academicians and scientists. Finally, in gross words, 'We must go' is the conclusion by some. That is a different thing. But we are using the word 'option'. But we are not eligible to use the word 'option' unless and until the following four minimum requirements are met. If they are met then we can say that we have an option nuclear of whatever. They are:

1. The capacity to design, fabricate and guarantee the yield of nuclear device within designed specification by nuclear establishment.

Whether we did it or not - as far as my knowledge goes - I do not think so.

2. Design parameters of the device is such that they can be accommodated for delivery by current and proposed delivery vehicles including aircraft, missiles and accepted as such by the Defence Research Department.
3. Reliability and performance of the Device as well as that of the delivery means, both current and proposed, should be sufficient to satisfy the operational requirement of the Armed Forces and command their confidence.
4. Availability of such devices should be sufficient for the Armed Forces to assure the effectiveness of them.

This is what we call as viable nuclear option. So, merely telling about 'option', after conducting one nuclear test, is of no use.

Therefore, if we have to be alert in terms of national security, we have to think very seriously about it. Today hundreds of nuclear warheads have been developed and produced by the U.S.A. and Russia. For China it needs a little more time. But the most effecting factor is the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan and technology transfer. Tomorrow even if Pakistan signs the C.T.B.T. it will not lose anything because the U.S.A. keeps the option. What is that option? It can supply technology; it can supply the readymade nuclear bombs to any country which she wants and the only binding thing is you sign the C.T.B.T. If we sign it is only to block our option.

Therefore, in the interest of the national security and in the interest of the threat perception and considering the attitudes of our adversaries like Pakistan and China we should not sign the C.T.B.T. We do not know when they may commit aggression. In spite of knowing all about Pakistan, the Brown Amendment itself was a miraculous thing. Shipment of military equipment has started.

Shortly, it is going to be delivered to Pakistan. We are talking about our options, but what about our preparedness in other things? I do not want to go into the details of the operational requirements of our defence forces and our immediate defence preparedness. I do not want to take much time of this House. We are clear on one point and it is about not signing the CTBT.

I urge upon the hon. Speaker and the Government to cooperate in passing a unanimous resolution in both Houses of Parliament about India's stand on CTBT and, if it fits in, about its options also. I do not want to go into the unnecessary details, but in a nutshell what I want to say is that India should not sign the CTBT. India will face the consequences; India has that will power and conviction to face the consequences and, as had already been mentioned by Shrimati Indira Gandhi, we have to face it and we have to sacrifice for tomorrow. Let us not fall into the trap of this CTBT. Let us pass a unanimous

resolution on this. Let all the political parties and the people of India stand in the defence of our national security and in the defence of our motherland.

SHRI RUPCHAND PAL (Hooghly) : Mr. Speaker, Sir, the hon. Minister, through two Statements in this House, besides the replies given to the queries made by the hon. Members in both the Houses, has tried to make clear the stand of the Government vis-a-vis the CTBT.

16.57 hrs.

(Mr. Deputy-Speaker in the Chair)

We are happy to note that the firm stand taken by the Government in the continuing negotiations, so far, reflects the national consensus. Through a rare agreement amongst the political parties of the country, we have come to a decision to ask the Government that India should take such a firm stand. It is a consistent stand. Some people may say that we, the Indians, who have been advocating the cause of world peace since decades are now speaking in a different voice. No, Sir, it is not so.

In a different world today, in the post Cold War era, the stand being taken by some other countries at this point of time is different because of the developments they have achieved in their own area or the progress they have made in nuclear tests and other things. I would like to remind this House that till 1993, the United States had been taking a totally different stand. They have been opposing whatever proposals that were coming towards global disarmament or comprehensive disarmament leading to the goal of nuclear weapons free world.

I am refraining from making any mention at this point of time certain lapses in the recent past because we want to stand united on this issue in spite of differences in our perceptions.

17.00 hrs.

Of course, there had been some dilution in 1993 when the joint declaration was made by our own Government vis-a-vis this issue in the United Nations General Assembly and since then we noticed a different attitude in the United States. There had been confusion. It may be out of context that even in March, some very important MEA official had been delinking our national security perception from our nuclear option. I am not just overemphasising it, but such things had happened and so we are happy to know that this United Front Government which has a commitment in its Common Minimum Programme to take a firm stand vis-a-vis CTBT has continued to reflect the aspirations of our countrymen.

Too much pressure is being mounted daily and there is coercion. It has been rightly stated in the Statement made by the hon. Minister today that nowhere in any international treaty such coercion has taken place as we do notice in Article 14 Entry into Force clause. It is unprecedented. It never happened in any international treaty in the past. Such corrections are continuing. This

country is capable of withstanding it, a thing to be appreciated by all of us.

The present draft of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty is discriminatory, unequal and also inadequate. It does not fulfil the task. It does not lead us to our genuine goal of total disarmament within a timeframe.

So, we are not agreeing to sign. Even the nuclear weapons states have their own differences. China has serious reservations. Even after the latest nuclear test they are saying no it is latest in the series and now they can join. Russia has its reservation because they do not have that computer simulation technology for a blast. Only vertical proliferation will not stop. France and the United States are taking one stand. Russia thinks that they can drag their feet. India is taking a particular stand on that pretext that they can drag their feet. There 21 countries do have serious differences among themselves. So, there is a concerted move to project India as a spoiler of the treaty. Here lies the crux of the problem. There is no contradiction that India being one of the advocates and champions of world peace is taking a different stand. No. Our failure is there. We are failing to be up to the mark in the new world situation. We are failing to take the diplomatic offensive. Why should we not inform the whole world that there are serious loopholes in the CTBT? That it is not going to serve any purpose. It is a concerted move attempted by a small number of countries to misguide others, to take a pretext so that their one contradiction and conflict may not come to the fore. We have failed in this diplomatic offensive. I am not referring to any particular State, any particular officer or any particular political executive for failure in this regard at any point of time.

I am refraining from making specific observation because this is not the right time to say so. Let us take a united stand. Whatever dilution might have taken place earlier in a certain context. I am desisting from mentioning that. The Government of India has taken a particular stand. We should see that we do not suffer any isolation. Sir, I am happy to note that in the latest statement made by the hon. Minister about the experience in Jakarta, not only Indonesia but some other countries also have been very seriously listening to our view points. We are watching the steps being taken by our Envoys there at the negotiating table, the latest move there is that India is neither disengaging nor blocking the adoption of the Draft of CTBT. Our only demand is that our viewpoint will have to be incorporated. Our opposition is not to CTBT as such. But our objection is to this particular, present form of the draft where we are being neglected and certain particular interests are being upheld. This particular viewpoint, to my mind, is not being adequately projected throughout the world.

Our media has a very important role to play in this regard. I will be happy to find our media play a more effective role to project our view point in the correct perspective. But it is not being done. While I support the stand taken by the Government, I would just caution this Government on two counts. One is: There may be people who may be trying to take political mileage of

a particular situation. But domestically taking a political mileage of a particular situation does not help the nation. It has happened in the past. I am not mentioning the name of any particular party or a particular group of people taking a particular stand. But trying to take political mileage relating to such sensitive national issues is a dangerous game. No serious political party should play this game.

Secondly, there are countries in the world who are looking forward to India to give the leadership. Here lies our criticism. The U.S. is putting pressure on the question of TRIPS and other things and on the floor of this House, the question was raised some time back that, the Government of India might have received some communication from the Government of the United States saying: "If you do not fulfil such and such conditions vis-a-vis WTO within the timeframe, we shall be compelled to take such steps." What is this? This is simple arm-twisting that if you do not react or act on that sphere, they would take such steps. They are all related to CTBT. CTBT and arm-twisting in relation to Patents are not isolated issues. Such pressures are continuing. But this is a different world. Some people say that it is a unipolar world. We do not think like that. The United States of America cannot do whatever it likes to do today. What happened in Cuba? There have been sanctions. Day before yesterday, we found an account of their economic achievement in spite of the sanctions continuing for years. In the case of China, there have been so many threats saying, "We shall do this thing; we shall do that thing." But within 24 hours, China responded in an appropriate manner. What happened?

The American industrialists in their own interests put pressure on the Clinton Administration saying that it would not do. It is because in this new world scenario, there was nothing to be dismayed if only such a vast country like India can stand up unitedly. Hence it is unique that all the political parties are united and they are saying in one voice not to sign the CTBT. It is a rare sort of a political agreement which is strengthening the position of the Government.

I shall be brief. This is not the time to go into details. There are so many things to be said about what happened to nuclear options, what may happen and the technological and other developments that are taking place daily.

I will conclude with an appeal to the government that the time is short and as early as possible and as effectively as possible, we should have the diplomatic offensive and not defensive, informing the whole world about the lacunae, about the loopholes in the CTBT and convince the world about the genuineness, sincerity and the correctness of the stand taken by the Government of India. The message should go that the Parliament of India has taken such a united stand and such is the national consensus.

SHRI G.G. SWELL (Shillong) : Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Sir, I have gone through the statement which the Minister

laid on the Table of the House on the 15th of July and I have also listened as carefully as possible to the statement he made just now. I do not see that, in substance, there is any difference between the two except that in the second statement, he had given us a little more details as to how many tests different countries had conducted, about the last test which China has made before it took a decision that it will also join the team of not having any more tests.

I think, this is a very trying moment for India, but at the same time, in a way, an ennobling moment. We are a big and a vast country. We have so many inbuilt differences in so many ways. But when it comes to the question of the safety and security of this country, we always have stood as one. It is a good thing that parliament by one voice, has said that we are not going to subscribe to the CTBT as it is now. However, we also need some education, some information. It is one thing to indulge in grave talking and another thing, in preparing ourselves and preparing the country for the situation. I had wished that the Minister of External Affairs had elucidated a number of things that you read in the media about what has been going on in Geneva. In his statement on the 15th, he had this to say, at page 2.

"We have also subsequently indicated that we will be constrained not to associate with the international monitoring system being set up to verify the CTBT."

I would like to know whether this international monitoring system exists even now when nuclear test can be conducted or have been conducted underground or overground. I would like to know whether we have a number of these international monitoring stations in India. How many of them are there? I would like to know whether we are going to remove those international monitoring stations as a first step to register our resentment against this insensitivity of the nuclear weaponised countries and the other countries refusing to link up the CTBT with nuclear disarmament.

If I understood the Minister correctly, he said :

"Even now they do not want to commit themselves that they will do away with the nuclear weapons which they have in their hands which ultimately will mean subsequently disarmament, not to speak of the timeframe."

They do not even say that. I would like this to clarify whether that is the position which means that they would like to continue with the nuclear weaponised hegemony as in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by which they succeeded that the five of them would continue to keep the nuclear weapon and continue to improve the quality of the nuclear weapons in perpetuating and the only people who will be prevented from acquiring these nuclear weapons would be the non-nuclear weaponised States. I would like to know whether they continue with that position today.

The Minister has also spoken of the vertical proliferation of these weapons by which I understand a continuous improvement of the nuclear weapons even after the CTBT has come into force. I would like him to explain how this is to be done. It would be of great help, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because when we support a particular thing, we must do with our eyes open. We must be able to speak to the people of our country with knowledge and authority. We must be able to speak to the world forum with knowledge and authority. It is not good repeating the same thing taking a high moral tone that we are not going to do this. Of course we are not going to do this. I for one would endorse this decision wholeheartedly. But I would like to be able to talk to everybody in the world with some kind of information. The Minister in his statement has said that the treaty as it was drafted till the last session of the conference of disarmament in Geneva concluded has been revised. This Conference has started again from the 29th of this month and a new treaty, a new text has been brought. I would like him to explain the position after all that had been going on in the last Conference for some time and we had reiterated our position in every possible way.

Now, he speaks of the new text being discussed. We would like to know whether there is any kind of a difference between the text as concluded in the last session of the conference and the Text being discussed now. He has said that we will continue with the discussion. On what basis has he said that?

I sometimes feel that it would be a good thing if, instead of a bare broad statement as this and the one he has made just now, he explains to us in simple words - maybe, a kind of a statement - in what different ways can the vertical proliferation take place, even after the CTBT. We hear talks of such things as hydro-dynamics; we hear talks of subcritical hydro testing; we hear talks of computer simulations; and different kinds of things. These are all very high technical expressions which we do not understand. It would be a good thing if he organises some kind of a meeting with our nuclear scientists who can explain to us how these things are done.

I would ask him to explain in particular this expression: 'national technical means', which the Americans are very keen should be a part of the Treaty. I am told that the Chinese are very sore about it. They are very sore about this because it would mean snooping by the Americans on whatever the Chinese do. It may not be an overground or an underground explosion any more, which could be monitored. But how do the Americans snoop on whatever the Chinese do for vertical proliferation of their weapons, even by these different means? We would like this to be explained to us.

Then, we hear a good deal about provisions relating to the 'entry into force' of this Treaty. We were told that the European Union countries have strong reservations to the provision with regard to the 'entry into force' of this Treaty. We would like to be enlightened on what those provision in this 'entry into force' of the Treaty are

that the European nations have objected to and with what result because I feel that in these kinds of differences, the mistrust that seems to take place between these different countries who are unanimous otherwise on the CTBT, we would be able to drive a wedge or to win friends for us.

I would like the Minister of External Affairs to explain whether these countries have been trying to paint India as a spoiler. There was a time when America took the position and said that this Treaty would be ratified, would be taken to the United Nations General Assembly for ratification and adoption only if the nuclear weapon countries sign it and the nuclear weapon threshold countries also sign it among the nuclear weapon threshold countries, we have Pakistan, India and Israel. They have been reported to say that unless India signs this, well, Britain is not going to sign it, Russia is not going to sign it, China is not going to sign it and the CTBT would be a non-starter. I would like to know whether that position was, at the time, to paint India as a spoiler.

I am finishing. I know that my time is very limited.

Another thing that we hear is that these countries will go ahead with the CTBT regardless of India. The latest position is that America will organise over 100 countries to sign this treaty. And these 100 countries will go to the United Nations Assembly and present it and have a vote taken by the United Nations Assembly in support of the CTBT by which the CTBT will become a document of the United Nations. What stand do we take in a position like that?

Dr. Mallikarajun has said the correct thing that this is not the time to make the bomb. I would support him there. It would be the most stupid thing for us to say that we make the bomb. Nobody makes that kind of an announcement. If we want to do something, do it. We do not have to proclaim to speak it to the wide world. prepare it only when the time comes. You speak it with action. We are speaking of keeping our option in view of our security concern and so on and so forth. Nobody disturbs you on that. But we would like some action. At the same time, we should prepare the people of this country of the consequences. America will not take it just lying down. The most important foreign policy of the American administration and of President Clinton - this is the election year for President Clinton - is to see that this non-proliferation and that CTBT are there. And, therefore, we should be prepared for the Americans. Now they have the Russians as their allies and they have the European Union as their allies. we should be prepared for stringent action.

What form of "stringent action", I do not know. We have heard of such expressions as 'nuclear castration'. See that our nuclear preparation is castrated right at the beginning. Is such a measure possible? In what way can it be possible? We should even prepare for some kind of sanctions which will have a more dangerous fallout on the economy of this country and we should prepare our people for that. These are the few things that they would like to pose to the hon. Minister. There

is no use just reiterating the same thing: "We agree on it. We agree on it. We agree on it."

Let us understand it. Let us be able to speak with some intelligence. Let us tell our people what it means. Let us prepare then for that situation.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH (Chittorgarh) : Sir, I do not want to make a speech. I do have five or six queries without any preamble. I would pose them to the hon. Minister. I will request him that when he comes to replying, it would be so good as to answer them.

The first one I would really repeat what my colleague Lt. General Prakash Mani Tripathi has said. I would request the hon. Minister to explain as to how he reconciles both his statement that nuclear weapons are not necessary for the country's defence and yet base the entire argument, that we are putting forward in the Conference on Disarmament and on CTBT, on this very basis that we need it for our security.

The second query is: Are we or are we not blocking? and if we are blocking, how are we doing it?

Thirdly, what exactly is it that the Government intends to block? Are you blocking the Test Ban Treaty? Are you interested only in blocking its Entry into Force? I would thereafter wish to know from the hon. Minister that if we fail to block, then what have you thought out as to what the policy would be?

From this, a logical question which arises is this. If he succeeds to block, is that the end of our policy or only a beginning of our policy? Please elucidate on this point. I would be grateful if the hon. Minister also explains as to whether it is possible for this Test Ban Treaty to enter into force even without an endorsement by the Conference on Disarmament from which the next question that arises is; Can the UN General Assembly endorse that which the Conference on Disarmament has rejected? What is the Government doing to ensure that does not happen?

The final clarification that I wish to seek is this. From all this, I find that it is really the Conference on Disarmament that is the venue at which the Government has to pro-actively take whatever action that it has to. Would the hon. Minister share with us what they intend doing now in the Conference on Disarmament, no simply in the Test Ban Treaty and what does the Government intend doing to ensure that an UN General Assembly vote - a straight and simply vote on this particular matter - is prevented and how will your attempt to achieve it?

Thank you, Sir, for calling my name. I had no intention to participate but since you called my name, I asked for certain clarifications.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Your name is there in the list.

SHRI JASWANT SINGH : Thank you, Sir.

SHRI PRITHVIRAJ D. CHAVAN (Karad) : Mr. Deputy-Speaker Sir, the Minister of External Affairs has clarified India's position very clearly on two occasions in the Lok

Sabha and also while speaking when he was abroad in Jakarta in the ASEAN forum. He has clarified in the House the unanimous stand taken by the present Minister of External Affairs and the previous Government that India will not sign the CTBT in its present form, that is, as long as there is no credible and firm linkage between CTBT and complete nuclear disarmament, as long as its scope is truly comprehensive and non-discriminatory, as long as non-explosive testing is not banned. On both these issues, nuclear weapon States have not relented. The position of the US in particular is very hypocritical. The US has all along resisted any attempt of test ban treaty but in the 1990s, there was an about-turn in the policy of US due to the changed strategic environment in the world and because of the sufficient test data that US had gathered in more than 1000 nuclear tests, its progress in computer simulation technology stockpiles of nearly 10,000 nuclear weapons.

Sir, while the US position is as it is, there are two misconceptions which are being bandied about. The first is that CTBT is a complete nuclear disarmament measure. Sir, it is not because the present Treaty as it is drafted will allow new qualitative research to take place and it will also allow weapons to be built based on old technology. So, it will definitely lead us to nuclear disarmament by itself. Secondly, absence of nuclear testing itself does not prevent development of new weapons because sub-critical test as planned by the US and advance computer simulation technology will allow the US particularly and France to develop new weapons even based on newer technology.

Our demand that there should be a positive and a firm linkage between complete nuclear disarmament and CTBT is not likely to be accepted by the United States. The United States has no intention of giving up their nuclear capability. They are only interested in maintaining the *status quo*. The US Defence Secretary has very clearly stated before the Senate Committee that the United States will require to maintain the nuclear deterrence for at least 50 years or perhaps more. The second thing is about no testing at all, even zero-yield testing, that is computer simulation testing against which India has very clearly taken a stand. The stand of the nuclear weapon States is, verification of such testing will be impossible as computer simulation can be done in any environment, in any laboratory. No verification system will be able to detect it. Therefore, it is impossible to include such a thing in the Treaty.

Therefore, the most likely scenario is, we will have to go into the next phase, that is, the entry into forced state, as to without our concerns being addressed to, the Treaty will have to be signed. India has taken a very clear stand, that it will not sign the Treaty in its present form and the present form is not likely to be changed. Therefore, the whole issue now comes down to the area of coming into force. When does the Treaty come into force? There are various situations here. The position of the United Kingdom, Russia, China and Pakistan is, unless the five nuclear weapon States and three threshold States sign the Treaty, it will not come into

force. But there are various new formulae being worked out, particularly in view of the India stand. India is in a position to block the Treaty because being a threshold State if it does not sign, the Treaty may not come into force - as per the stand of the three or four major nations. But the so called waiver or provisional EIF, if India does not sign the Treaty, would come into force is now being talked about.

The Chairman's draft as of 20th June, is definitely based on the combination of the Members of the Conference on Disarmament and the nuclear capability of the State. Two other concepts that have been floated around are, the positive conference to be held three years after the Treaty is open for signature and the annual review after that. This positive conference will keep on furthering the progress of ratification of the State which have already ratified and wait till all the States required signed the Treaty or ratified the Treaty. Only then will it come into force.

India will have to be very careful because the negotiations now are entirely hinging on the forced requirement. We have to see that our interests are not jeopardized. We will not sign the Treaty but also see, as the Pakistani delegates has proposed, it should come into force with a simple vote in the Security Council hinting indirectly that the Security Council should also impose certain economic sanctions against India if India try to block the Treaty. India also has made it very clear that it will withdraw from the seismic international monitoring system if its views are not adhered to and that is the stand which we will have to maintain.

I would like to mention two points in this connection. Perhaps it is already late now. I personally wonder as to why in the actual negotiations the Government of India did not support the Chinese stand on the peaceful nuclear explosions. Unfortunately, China has now dropped the PNE requirement and has accepted the zero-yield CTBT, but it wants NPT to be mentioned in the draft, and to be taken up in a review conference. Perhaps if India had supported the Chinese stands, China would not have dropped the requirement of peaceful nuclear explosions, and India could have maintained its right to develop nuclear weapons under the pretext of peaceful nuclear explosions, because what we carried out at Pokaran was PNE. This is one area which somehow India opposed.

The second clause which India could have brought is - I do not know if it is possible to bring it now - is about prohibition against transfer of technology in any form, whether it is equipment, machinery, or weapons grade fissile material, from nuclear weapon States down to non-nuclear weapons States. It could have addressed the problem faced by India when China was supposed to have given to Pakistan nuclear technology, equipment, and centrifugals which are used for producing weapon grade fissile material. But perhaps to bring these new issues at this late stage will be difficult, if the treaty gets over soon. If it does not, these two new points should be brought in.

Finally, it boils down to India retaining its nuclear option. We want to retain the nuclear option because of two of our close neighbours, one is already a nuclear weapon State and the other is at threshold State which has declared that it has a stockpile of nuclear weapons. So, it is imperative that India maintains its nuclear option. But, actually going in for nuclear option, creating a credible stockpile of nuclear weapons, deliver systems, whether they are missile-based, or airborne delivery systems, or submarine based delivery systems, are going to be very expensive options. There are among us people who advocate that India should immediately take to the nuclear option and go in for making nuclear bombs. But, apparently, it is an option which is going to be very expensive. Perhaps, at this stage of our development going in for a fullfledged nuclear weapon capability may not be advisable. What would be required is that India retain its nuclear energy programme in its full swing, fund the nuclear research totally, even increasing the allocation substantially, particularly the new programmes like the fast-breeder test reactor programme, and develop its technology in the area of computer simulation, hydro-dynamic testing, subcritical low yield testing and thereafter, when required, if the political situation changes, go in for the actual nuclear weapon programme.

If we do not sign the CTBT, as planned, there is a possibility that the States such as Russia, UK, and China which, perhaps, do not want it do come into existence are going to blame India and single out India as a country which blocked the treaty. We have to launch a diplomatic offensive and tell the world, beginning with the non-aligned countries, the G-21 countries and the rest of the developing world about India's stand on this discriminatory treaty, and as to why India really should have singled out not as a nuclear capable state but as a nuclear weapon State, because we have already demonstrated our nuclear weapon capability by Pokhran PNE.

But in spite of that, Sir, there would be a possibility of serious arm-twisting, perhaps, indirectly as we have seen in the case of action at WTO, or maybe even more directly by some sanctions voted in the Security Council and the India will have to tighten its belt that country of continental proportions cannot be threatened, its arms cannot be twisted by people whose policy has all along been totally hypocritic.

This House should send a clear message that on this issue of CTBT, the entire country across the political party lines is united and behind the stand taken by the Government of India, the Foreign Ministry that the CTBT in its present context will not be signed by India no matter what consequences are.

[Translation]

SHRI BRIJ BHUSHAN TIWARI (Dumariaganj): Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, I would like to say that India is the originator of the Test Ban Treaty which is under discussion. It was India who conceived that there should be a ban on the production, use and proliferation of

nuclear weapons. But the present Test Ban Treaty is totally different from then one we originally conceived. The basic concept was not based on selfish motives, but there is a definite motive behind the text of the present treaty. Through this treaty the five nuclear states want to maintain their supremacy in this domain while at the same time they want to dominate under developed countries and 'nuclear threshold' countries. Therefore, India would not be party to this CTBT treaty. Our External Affairs Minister, who was in Jakarta recently had clearly told state secretary of U.S.A. Mr. Kristofer that India would not approve the Treaty in its present form. It is also important that his view has been expressed after consultation with all the political parties in the country. The same view has been expressed in this House also that India is not going to sign this Treaty in its present form. There are two reasons for it. Firstly we want to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secondly, we wish there should be a time bound programme for disarmament. That programme should be transparent. We have seen that even after passing Nuclear Proliferation Treaty all kinds of nuclear related technology and nuclear armaments had been transferred or smuggled. These countries have failed to stop nuclear test and China has made nuclear tests country. All this supports India's view that this treaty has failed on both counts. While the Treaty puts a ban and Nuclear tests it does not stop nuclear countries from proliferation. It also does not stop from doing research and making qualitative improvement in the nuclear arsenal. So long we are not sincere to achieve disarmament no purpose would be served by CTBT.

Sir, I would say that what we could not achieve through MBT we are trying to achieve through CTBT. What is the state of affairs in the world today. The G-7 countries which have 1/10 of the total population of the world are exercising control over 60 per cent resources of the world. India is not going to accept this situation. India is a democratic country. Besides India all the democratic countries of the world who have been struggling to retain their freedom are not going to ratify a treaty which is discriminatory.

Perhaps due to the soft attitude of the previous Govt. the five nuclear countries may have been under the impression that ultimately they would be able to prevail upon India to ratify this treaty. This impression may have been reinforced on account of our liberalisation policy because of which our economic dependence on the developed countries have increased manifold. Therefore they would be able to persuade or coerce India to sign this treaty. In the previous Govt. it was the Ministry of Finance which was dictating the policies of our Govt. But this chapter has been virtually closed by our Govt. and specially by our External Affairs Minister. I commend the efforts made by our Govt. in these directions as it reflects our commitment to non-interference to our policies, national freedom, self respect and security of our country. These ideals have inspired us that come what may India was not going to ratify this treaty. The hon. Minister of External Affairs

has done a good thing by reiterating his concept of National Security Council. He has also said that he is going to strengthen it further. Hon. Members should not have any doubt in their mind that our Govt. is going to sign this treaty in its present form. I fully support my hon. friend who said that Govt. must make it clear that the amendment which they propose to move or the steps they propose to take should not in any way go against the spirit of the Bill.

SHRI GEORGE FERNANDES (Nalanda) : Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, We could understand the purpose of Non Proliferation Treaty. It was an attempt on the part of nuclear weapon states to continue their hegemony and put a ban on other states to manufacture them. But I cannot understand the nuclear CTBT. Because there is nothing comprehensive about it. Nuclear-weapon states not only want to retain their arsenal of nuclear weapons, they want to continue their production and also to perpetuate their right to use them. It would be wrong to assert that we have conceived this treaty. Our stand has been to completely eliminate the atom bomb and to have a nuclear free world. India has always advocated in various fora of the world to usher in an era of nuclear free world for the last 40 to 50 years.

What is the biggest objection to this treaty. In fact we all know this. However, the House should know the policy of U.S.A. in this regard. In his address to joint session of both the Houses of U.S. Parliament, President Clinton on July 1994 has said, I quote :

[English]

"We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it..."

That is, that leadership.

"... that seeking nuclear advantage would be a futile. Therefore, we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk..."

[Translation]

Here is a threat.

[English]

"... a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders."

[Translation]

U.S.A. is not in any way concerned with the security of India. Our security is closely linked with our relation with our neighbouring countries.

18.00 hrs.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : Two hours had been allotted for this subject. I have got eight names more of hon. Members who want to speak on this subject. Should

we increase the time by two hours. If it is finished before that...

(Interruptions)

SHRI MANORANJAN BHAKTA (Andaman and Nicobar Islands) : The business will continue till the discussion is over...*(Interruptions)*

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : Yes, you want to say something.

(Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : Two suggestion have come.

Discussion can be continued today or it can be postponed for tomorrow. What do you want?

THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (I.K. GUJRAL) : We can discuss it tomorrow.

SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS : Yes, please continue it tomorrow.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER : Shri George Fernandes you may continue tomorrow.

(Interruptions)

18.01 hrs.

MOTION RE : CONTEMPT OF THE HOUSE BY A PERSON FROM THE PUBLIC GALLERY

[English]

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : As the House is aware, at about 1155 hours today, a visitor calling himself Hansa Dutt Joshi, son of Shri Purnanand Joshi attempted to shout slogans from the Visitors' Gallery. The Security Officers took him into custody immediately and interrogated him. The visitor has made a statement and expressed regrets for his action.

I bring it to the notice of the House for such action as the House may deem fit.

THE MINISTER OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS AND MINISTER OF TOURISM (SHRI SRIKANTA JENA): Sir, I beg to move :

"That this House resolves that the person calling himself Hansa Dutt Joshi, son of Shri Purnanand Joshi who attempted to shout slogans at about 1155 hours today and whom the Security Officers took into custody

immediately, has committed a grave offence and is guilty of the contempt of the House.

This House further resolves that he be let off with a stern warning on the rising of the House today."

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Motion moved :

"That this House resolves that the person calling himself Hansa Dutt Joshi, son of Shri Purnanand Joshi who attempted to shout slogans at about 1155 hours today and whom the Security Officers took into custody immediately, has committed a grave offence and is guilty of the contempt of the House.

This House further resolves that he be let off with a stern warning on the rising of the House today."

DR. ASIM BALA (Navadwip) : How did he get the Visitor's Pass? We want to know from the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs about it...*(Interruptions)*.

[Translation]

SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE (Lucknow) : Mr. Deputy Speaker, I support the motion moved by the Parliamentary Affairs Minister. I think this punishment is enough. Let us hope such incidents would not take place in future...*(Interruptions)*

[English]

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : The question is :

"That this House resolves that the person calling himself Hansa Dutt Joshi, son of Shri Purnanand Joshi who attempted to shout slogans at about 1155 hours today and whom the Security Officers took into custody immediately, has committed a grave offence and is guilty of the contempt of the House.

This House further resolves that he be let off with a stern warning on the rising of the House today."

The motion was adopted.

MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER : Now the House stands adjourned to meet again on August 1, 1996.

18.04 hrs.

The Lok Sabha then adjourned till Eleven of the Clock on Thursday, August 1, 1996/Sravana 10, 1918 (Saka).